It's become clear that approach has not worked yet, and will not work as fast as was hoped. Now the consensus is shifting again, and the current thinking is that the government will need to set up a "bad bank" similar to the Resolution Trust Corporation, which bought up bad assets of savings and loans in the crisis of the 1980s. It turns out, it seems, that if the government doesn't buy all those bad mortgages and other failing securities, the banks will simply keep taking whatever money is given to them to lend out and use it to shore up their balance sheets.
This leaves us back almost exactly where we were three months ago. The next debate among economists will be about how much the government will have to pay for all those bad assets. The answer, unfortunately, is going to be "a lot more than they are worth." At this point, however, the concern about how much the bailout will cost is looking a lot less important than finding a solution to the intractable and worsening credit crisis--it's turned from a question of "How much will this cost us?" into one of "Is there any stimulus plan that's likely to succeed?"